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Summary: In reality privatization has never occurred according to the handbook rules of 
ordinary market transactions. Not even in advanced market economies can privatization 
transactions be described by the Walrasian or Arrowian, or Leontiefian equilibrium 
models, or by the equilibrium models of the game theory. In these economies transac-
tions of privatization take place in a fairly organic way – which means that those are 
driven by the dominance of private property rights and in a market economy. But despite 
this fact Western privatization also some peculiar features as compared to ordinary com-
pany takeovers, since the state as the seller may pursue non – economic goals. Changes 
in the dominant form of property change positions and status of many individuals and 
groups in the society. That’s why privatization can even less be explained by ordinary 
market mechanisms in transition countries where privatizing state-owned property have 
happened in a mass scale and where markets and private property rights weren't estab-
lished at the time process of privatization began. In this paper I’ll discuss and analyze the 
phenomenon of privatization in context of different economic theories, arguing that em-
pirical results go in favor of the public choice theory (Buchanan, 1978), theory of “eco-
nomic constitution” (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985), (Buchanan and Tullock, 1989), and 
theory of “collective action” (Olson, 1982). These theories argues that transition from 
one economic system into another, for example transition from collectivistic, socialistic 
system into capitalism and free market economy with dominant private property, will not 
happen through isolated changes of only few economic institutions, no matter how deep 
that changes would be. In other words privatization can not give results if it's not fol-
lowed by comprehensive change of economic system, because privatized companied 
wouldn't be able to operate in old environment. 
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Despite the fact that property rights are the keystone of an economic system and 
provide the basis for trade and a market economy, until 1960s there almost was 
no theoretical work on the central role they play in economic development. Until 
Coase, Demsetz, and Alchian began writing, economists were taking property 
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rights as a given and their economic analysis lied on the assumption that the 
western-style rules and norms regarding the use and allocation of property were 
present. This assumption is usually valid in developed capitalistic world, but not 
in the areas where those institution are absent.  
Along with property right issues phenomenon of privatization has come 
in the focus of economic analysis in last few decades of previous century. How-
ever, people have recognized importance of private property much before that. 
According to the theory of natural law, property and property rights are consid-
ered to be one of the natural rights that belong to people. The idea of natural 
right has roots in the philosophy of ancient Greeks, even before Aristotle, in the 
works of Greek stoics (5th century before Christ). Romans stoic school, which 
put moral values above all other values, took over the idea of natural rights. Di-
gesta, the piece that systematizes and provides easier implementation of very 
complex Roman law at the time, begins with three famous Ulpianus law com-
mandments
1 
1.  Live honestly - Honeste vivere 
2.  Don’t offend others - Alterum non laedere 
3.  Everybody should get what belong to him - Suum cuiljue tribuere.  
The third commandment, i.e. answer on the question: how everybody 
could get what belongs to him is related to property rights – one of the basic in-
stitutions of the society.  
The issue of property was not discussed only in economic theory. Thus 
one of the characters in Gete’s literal opus, the hero from Greek mythology 
Epimeteus
2 asks his brother Prometheus
3: "What belongs to you?". Clever Pro-
metheus answers: „Only things that are result of my activity: nothing more and 
nothing less then that". The whole history of civilization can be viewed in be-
tween the Ulpianus’ requirement and Promethus’ answer. 
When we speak on property rights and privatization in economic terms, 
as many other economic ideas, this one was also discussed in Adam Smith’s 
work. He writes on privatization in his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations: „As soon as the land of any country has all become pri-
vate property, the landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they never 
sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural produce.”
4 
“When the crown lands had become private property, they would, in the 
course of a few years, become well-improved and well-cultivated...the revenue 
                                                 
1 Beside Digesta, there are few more acts that provide implementation of Roman law: Institutiones, 
Regulae/Definitiones, Comments of civic code, Responsa, Sententiae. 
2 Epimetheus is charachter from Greek mithology, the son of Japet, brother of Prometheus and 
Atlas, and Pandora’s huspband. Epimetheus is a greek word for transparency. 
3 Prometheus is the titan who stole the fire from Zevs and gave it the people. Zevs punished him 
for that. 
4 Smith, A. (1776) “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book I 
Chapter VI”, Translation: Global book, Novi Sad, 1998 Privatization in Economic Theory 
  105 
which the crown derives from the duties of customs and excise, would necessar-
ily increase with the revenue and consumption of the people. 
In every great monarchy of Europe the sale of the crown lands would 
produce a very large sum of money, which, if applied to the payment of the pub-
lic debts, would deliver from mortgage a much greater revenue than any which 
those lands have ever afforded to the crown…“
5 
Dominant form of property
6 in a society influences features of many so-
cial relations and the way these relations are regulated. Changes in the prevailing 
form of property change positions and status of many individuals and groups in 
the society. That’s why this phenomenon is always just one element of compre-
hensive change of social system that take place simultaneously with changes in 
other area of society. Development of market mechanisms is immanent to the 
societies with dominant private property, while plan and command economy op-
erate in societies where collective property prevails.
7   
From this point of view, privatization is the key stone and basic founda-
tion of transition processes. In almost each of the former socialistic countries 
privatization, along with introduction of multiparty political system, has been the 
sign that transition process has begun, at least in mechanical terms.
8 It is also the 
true that there is almost no country in the world that has not privatized at least 
one state or public company in last few decades. 
However, when privatization wave spread over Europe there was no too 
much theoretical work in economics on the issue. Privatization has become 
popular in Western countries after Reagan and Thatcher, but East and Central 
European countries could hardly use Western experiences to create privatization 
programs. Privatization in (nominally or real) capitalist economies occurred in 
individual cases and as isolated transactions, and was not, as in transition 
economies, comprehensive process aimed to start complete change of social sys-
tem. Privatization on the West is usually related to public goods, so-called „natu-
ral monopolies“, utilities, sector of telecommunication and energy, but these 
transaction look pretty simple in comparison to the privatization in transition 
economies, which was supposed to attain complex set of economic, political and 
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Chapter VI”, Book V Chapter II Part II, Translation: Global book, Novi Sad, 1998 
6 When I say dominant form of property I mean by that whether state or private property is prevail-
ing in a society. 
7 See: Vukotic, V. (1993), “Privatization and Development of Market Economy”, Institute of So-
cial Sciences, Center for Economic Research, Belgrade 
8 One of the assumptions I start with is that there is significant difference between mechanical 
transition (meaning privatization, liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization) and organic transi-
tion (meaning real changes of prevailing way of thinking in ex-socialistic countries, introduction 
of capitalistic structures in real life). While mechanic transition need several years to happen, de-
pending on the country, organic transition takes much more time and is still happening in, I would 
dare to say, in all ex-socialistic countries, including those, which have visibly “finished” transition 
phase and joined EU. See more on this in Vukotic, V. (2003), “Is transition heading the wrong 
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social goals. It is clear that privatization in transition countries has features of 
economic, political and social phenomenon, but there was no clear answer in 
theory whether that is the case in the West. Vickers i Yarrow (1988) say that 
privatization on the West is „very high on the political agenda“
9, but they ex-
plore its economic consequences, trying to prove that privatization is just an 
economic phenomenon, and as such privatization transactions are as same as 
regularly market transaction with some special features. However, in case stud-
ies they’ve presented in the book, political causes and implications of many ac-
tivities related to the privatization transactions in the West can not be avoided. In 
other words political dimension of privatization is evident both in ex-socialist 
countries with dominant state property, and in the societies with dominant pri-
vate property. 
 
1. Microeconomic analysis of privatization market 
 
Ordinary markets of goods and services differ depending on mechanisms that 
influence demand, supply and price formation, rules of entry and exit and the 
issue of competitively. No matter whether the market is competitive, oligopolis-
tic or monopolistic, which rules regulate entry or exit, commodity, capital and 
money market can be characterized as ordinary market when the goods traded on 
the market are reproducible, and transaction of market exchange can be repeated. 
Mechanisms that influence demand, supply and price formation can be defined 
as repetitive game between the participants in market exchange – the buyer and 
the seller. The fact that the transaction can be repeated and that traded goods can 
be reproduced, doesn’t mean static stability. On the contrary, factors that deter-
mine supply and demand are changing, as well as the prices. But, the rules ac-
cording to which market transactions are happening are stable. All exchange par-
ties on ordinary markets must act according to the rules, no matter who they are. 
State, if involved in ordinary market transaction should follow market rules, but 
this is usually not the case.  
Opposite from ordinary market the state has a privileged position on the 
privatization market and fully exploits it. The state, as a seller on privatization 
market has an exclusive and unilateral right to initiate transaction and manages 
it, whether the state wants to sell its property, or to give away its property right
10. 
The seller on ordinary market can also exercise his unilateral and exclusive right 
to sell his property. Yet, there is significant difference between the seller on or-
dinary market and the state as a seller on privatization market. Goods traded on 
ordinary markets have market price determined by ordinary market rules, and 
potential demand for these goods exist. Thus, a market agent who wants to buy – 
potential buyer can initiate transaction of exchange and become actual buyer. 
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The relation between demand, supply and the price are determined by ordinary 
market rules.  
Privatization transaction usually means selling of an existing state-
owned company that still operates. Privately owned companies are also sold 
permanently on the capital markets. Where are the differences? The criteria for 
determining who is going to be exchange partner in transaction on capital market 
is straight forward – the price. On the other side, state as a seller of its property 
put many requirements in front of potential buyer. Beside the price, potential 
buyer need to fulfill certain technological requirements; to have satisfactory 
market share in certain industry; investment plans for the future; program of re-
structuring; to keep the determined level of employment in the company, social 
programs for redundant employees... If the state as a seller accepts a buyer, and a 
buyer is ready to agree on the requirements, then these become buyer’s promises 
for future. When the deal is made and the property is sold, the state has mainly 
non-economic tools available to put pressure on the buyer to keep the promises. 
Whether he’s going to attain promised, very much depend on the buyer and his 
business strategy, but even more on the economic environment overall. As Ma-
jor (1993) says, in the conditions of well protected property rights it is less likely 
that the buyer will fail to fulfill the promises
11.  
It can be concluded that principles behind supply and demand are com-
pletely different on ordinary as opposed to privatization market. Buyers and sell-
ers on ordinary markets are driven by economics motives: buyers want cheaper 
price and better quality, and sellers want to get the highest price possible for his 
good. On the other side the act of exchange on privatization market is unique! 
State as a seller want to achieve more then just pure economic goal represented 
through higher price of property for sale. Sometimes these proclaimed goals are 
contradictory, so you can hear that the state wants restructuring, but at the same 
time to keep employment in the company on certain level. Besides, the proce-
dure of evaluation and price determination of property for sale can not be fea-
tured as regular, due to the fact that the process can not be repeated. Price is set 
on certain date, between specified buyer and seller, an if the agreement fails, 
new potential buyer and the state as a seller will go into negotiation on the price 
again, independently on the previously set price. 
Bargains procedure is common in price determination on ordinary mar-
ket, but it follows certain rules: price is dependent on price of substitutes and 
complementary good. On the other side there is no benchmark for price determi-
nation on privatization market. There is no such thing as comparable price of 
property that is to be privatized, because even when the value of equipment and 
buildings of two companies are similar, the price can not be the same because 
the object of exchange is not equipment, but complex organization of company 
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consisted of material and non-material elements: knowledge of employees, hu-
man capital, image, brand,...  
Mainstream economists would formalize previous statements in mathe-
matical manner: functions representing supply and demand on privatization 
market are not continuous, and as such not differentiable. Consequently, the 
price of state owned property can not be determined only as function of supply 
and demand. This because supply of and demand for state owned property are 
undetermined themselves, and there are many factors other then supply and de-
mand that influence the price. 
There are several approaches aimed to explain determination of the price 
on privatization market. 
One of them bases on Tobin’s q theory
12. It says that the price of state 
owned property is value of discounted sum of all future profits that will be gen-
erated from the property for sale. This assumes existence of capital market, 
which will generate market value of the state property. However, capital market 
development follows privatization so this doesn’t hold. On the other side, if we 
apply Tobin’s q-theory in determination of the price of state property, we as-
sume that the profitability of privatized company will not change significantly 
after privatization, which is contrary to the main purpose of privatization. To 
conclude, applying Tobin’s theory is not feasible in price determination on pri-
vatization market.  
The attempt to define the price function of the state property in the game 
theory seemed convenient. But, having in mind the fact that non-economic fac-
tors play important role in price formation, game theory approach is also impos-
sible. 
The transaction of privatization is unique, but there are also other infre-
quent transactions when the object of exchange is some rare good, piece of art, 
or real estate. Despite the fact that these transactions are rare, or have happen for 
instance just once, they are based on economic principles and following rules of 
ordinary market transactions. 
The question being raised here is why are privatization transactions so 
different from ordinary market transaction, even those in which the object of ex-
change is some extremely valuable good? If the buyer and the seller of state 
property are guided with same motives as buyer and seller as unique piece of art, 
then features of privatization transaction can be similar to the features of the 
transaction on auction type markets. But, state administration and bureaucrats 
can hardly be guided with motives similar to those which move sellers of unique 
values on action, and it influences the feature of transaction. 
Analysis has shown there is no transaction of privatization that can be 
explained by equilibrium models of Walrass, Arrow and Leontief, no matter 
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whether it happened in economies with dominant private property and capitalis-
tic structure, or ex socialist countries with dominant state property. Privatization 
market is influenced not only by economic factors, but also with political and 
social issues, and there is no pure economic explanation of privatization. That’s 
why all classic microeconomic theoretical models are impotent in explaining 
privatization transactions.  
 
2. Theories of organic evolution of property rights 
 
Feasible theories of privatization in modern economic history originate from in-
stitutional theory of firm, introduced by Coase
13, and later developed by Dem-
setz
14. Coase has also dealt with issue of privatization within theory of transac-
tion costs (social costs)




18 who founded the theory 
of property rights. These theories have its roots in Austrian school of economics 
and can be related to von Hayek’s
19 and von Mises’s
20 critics of collective eco-
nomic systems. 
All of these theories describe what conditions are necessary and sufficient so 
as private property can prevail in a society. These theories suggest that individ-
ual economic agents, whether they are individual owners or firms, form founda-
tion of economic system. If private property is prevailing then individuals and 
firms can act as autonomous economic agents in economic system. Besides, 
these theories explain the transactions among economic agents through which 
property rights can be and are actually being exercised.  
Steve Pejovich emphasizes two important dimensions of property 
rights.
21 First, it would be wrong to separate property rights from other human 
rights. The rights of an individual to write or talk are property rights of that indi-
vidual, because they regulate the relations between that individual and other 
people. Thus, property rights always refer to relation between people. Second 
dimension of property rights originate from the first: property rights are always 
related to individuals. If I own the car, my possession of the car doesn’t regulate 
the relation between me and the car, but the relation between me and all other 
individuals in the society with regard to the right to use the car. This confirms 
                                                 
13 Coase, R. (1937) “The Nature of Firm”, Economica, (4), 386-405 
14 Demsetz, H (1988) “Ownership, Control and the Firm”, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
15 Coase, R (1960) “The Problem of Social Costs”, Journal of Law and Economic, (3), 1-44 
16 Alchian, A; Demsetz, H. (1973) “The property right paradigm”, Journal of Economic History, 
33 (17), 16-27 
17 Williamson, O. (1985) “The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Rational 
Contracting”, London: Macmillan  
18 Pejovich, S. (1990) “The Economics of Property Rights: Toward the Theory of Comparative 
System”, Dordrecht: Kluwer 
19 Hayek, F. (1944) “The Road to Serfdom”, Global book, Novi Sad, Translation, 1997 
20 Mises, L. (1935) “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Common-wealth”, London, Routhledge 
21 Pejovich, S. (1990) “The Basis of American Capitalism”, Naucna knjiga, Belgrade,  Maja Drakić 
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the notion of property rights as an institution regulates norms of behavior with 
regard to scarce economic resources.
22 
Theory of transaction costs, the theory of firm and property rights theory 
give a clear picture what mass privatization will give as a result at the end. But, 
none of them deals too much with the features of the path how to get there. And 
that was the source of many critics addressed on these theories.
23 But argument 
that theories of „organic“ evolution of property rights are not giving instructive 
advices how to transfer society from the point where state or collective property 
prevails, to the point where private property prevails has not strong point. Espe-
cially having in mind the fact that all attempts and empirical studies aimed to 
determine which privatization method is the most effective and give the best re-
sults have failed. The same methods implemented in different countries give 
completely different results; depending on the circumstances in the environment 
privatization is taking place. These theories developed much before the transi-
tion process has started and if they had given any instructions on how to privat-
ize, they would probably have failed. On the other side, when we speak about 
the choice of privatization method, even though the theories of organic evolution 
of property rights don’t give clear instructions which privatization method or 
model will give the best results, they indicate some important features of privati-
zation transaction that can serve as an benchmark for decision makers who man-
age privatization processes.  
In order to prove this, I’ll analyze mass privatization in the context of 
Coase’s theorem.  
The Coase’s theorem says: Efficient allocation of resources doesn’t de-
pend on original allocation of property rights over resources, if 1) there are no 
transaction costs and 2) property rights are clearly defined. 
The transaction costs are costs of exchange of property rights. They in-
clude direct costs of exchange (seeking opportunities for exchange, collecting 
information, negotiation costs, fees economic agents must pay in order to com-
plete exchange transaction) and costs of maintaining institutional structure 
needed for any kind of economic activity to take place (judiciary, police, infra-
structure). Clearly defined property rights
24 means that the property rights are 
protected and that owners can freely exercise property rights and use their prop-
erty according to their free will. The protection of property rights means that the 
state guarantees inviolability of private property and strong commitment that the 
state won’t usurp private property through high taxes.  
                                                 
22 See more: Vukotic, V. (1993), “Privatization and Development of Market Economy”, Institute 
of Social Sciences, Center for Economic Research, Beograd, 
23 See more Mayor, I. (1993) “Privatization in Eastern Europe: A Critical Approach”, Eldershot, 
UK and Brookfield, US: Edward Elgar 
24 This is my free interpretation of the term «clearly defined property rights» suitable for the 
analysis given below, and is in accordance with Coase’s theorem. The Coase’s theorem is 
originaly created with purpose to analyse externalities, but it can be stated and interpreted on many 
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If we consider problem of choice of privatization method in the context 
of Coase’s theorem we can conclude: If the property rights are clearly defined 
and transaction costs are low enough, then privatization method is not of big im-
portance. The resources will always go toward most efficient uses in certain cir-
cumstances.  
In the context of Coase’s theorem privatization method determines the 
features of „original“ allocation of resources. As we have concluded, the choice 
of privatization method from theoretical point of view is not important, which 
means that it doesn’t influence the efficiency. Original distribution of property 
rights among private individuals or firms doesn’t influence final outcome of pri-
vatization with regard to efficiency. After the mass privatization take place, 
property rights are distributed among private individuals or firms. The way these 
private property rights are distributed depends on the privatization method, but 
further flows of privately owned resources toward efficient uses does not depend 
on the original distribution of property rights, but on the fact whether other two 
conditions are satisfied. In other words it is important whether transaction costs 
are low, and whether private property rights are clearly defined, meaning pro-
tected and transferable. 
The real world is, however, the world of positive transaction costs. In the 
world of no transaction costs at all, original allocation of property rights is not of 
importance for the efficiency, because exchange transactions are smooth and 
clear. In real world, the exchange transactions are in certain cases neither fast, 
nor easy, and sometimes even not possible. That’s why original allocation of 
property rights matters. High transaction costs usually characterize privatization 
transactions, and that’s why privatization method that determines „original allo-
cation“ of property rights over resources influence the structure of economy and 
economic efficiency for a longer period of time. 
25 
The features that differs privatization transactions from ordinary market 
transactions are already outlined before, but the question raised here is what are 
the chances for efficient distribution of property rights through privatization in 
the environment with positive (and high) transaction costs? What is necessary so 
as the allocation of resources can be characterized as efficient? How can we de-
termine whether the allocation of resources will be efficient or not? The answer 
is clear: the price mechanisms. Critics would say that price mechanism can work 
only on ordinary markets, not on privatization market. The differences between 
the way price mechanism functions on ordinary in comparison with privatization 
market are outlined above. But, no matter whether we are speaking about ordi-
nary market transaction or privatization transaction, featured with different price 
determination, the level of price is the key variable in the process of property 
rights exchange. The informative role of price is very important – the agents that 
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are the most likely to earn the highest profit from exercising certain property 
right; will offer the highest price to obtain that property right. Thus, the price 
offered by a potential buyer indicates perspectives of his investment and likeli-
hood that investment will be efficient. The resources will go toward their most 
efficient uses only if they are being held by economic agents who are ready to 
pay the highest price to obtain these resources.  
The conclusion we could draw is: if state property is privatized through 
sales, then the method, which transfer state property into hands of economic 
agents ready to pay the highest price will allocate the resources on the most effi-
cient ways. If this condition is satisfied, with regard to Coase’s theorem imple-
mented in the real world of high transaction costs, then the original distribution 
of private property rights will be as efficient as possible. 
However, as already outlined in the first part of paper, price offered by a 
potential buyer of state property is not the key criteria when the state determines 
who will get the deal. It is much more important whether potential buyer intends 
to invest in the company or not; what is the core business of a potential buyer; or 
what social program he offers. The emphasis is put on non-economic features 
and that is the reason why privatization transaction differs from ordinary market 
transaction. It is not understood here, that the price someone offers is the best 
indicator of his intentions. In other words price indicate the likelihood that the 
company will be successful. If potential buyer offers the highest price, it means 
that he has already invested the most and he considers his investment profitable. 
That’s why it is more likely that he’ll be successful and will continue to invest in 
the company in the future. Otherwise he wouldn’t enter the deal.  
If anybody thinks that there are better criteria for efficient allocation of 
resources then price, then the goals and aims in the background are usually of 
different nature and are not related to efficient allocation. The problem of discre-
tionary power to make decisions always arise when there is no unique criteria for 
decision making. When the price is not criteria to determine who’ll be the buyer 
of state property, then the politicians can arbitrary determine the buyer and space 
for corruption is open. 
Condition that the buyer must be well known company from the same 
industry as the company that is being sold is interesting, because the seller put 
limits on the demand himself. Thus, he consciously reduces selling price. The 
costs of social program are built into the price. It is just the different way of ex-
pressing the total amount of money someone is willing to offer to buy the com-
pany. Finally, social policy is the job of the state, not the job of an entrepreneurs 
and foreign investors.
26  
To conclude, Coase’s theorem indicates that more the privatization 
transactions are similar to ordinary market transactions it is more likely that 
original allocation of resources will be efficient. Privatization transactions driven 
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by the price as main criteria to determine the partner of state in the exchange are 
more likely to be successful, i.e. to provide efficient allocation of resources. One 
more conclusion can be drawn with regard to the level of transaction costs and 
protection of property rights. Namely, reduction of transaction costs and protec-
tion of property rights are extremely important for the success of privatization. 
This conclusion must be put in broader context. Transaction costs of pri-
vatization can be roughly divided on the costs of seller and costs of buyer. 
Transaction costs of seller include costs of institutional changes, costs related to 
estimating value of capital, costs related to issuing and distributing shares, costs 
of collecting information, etc. Transaction costs of buyer consist of costs related 
to collecting information on real value of the companies, shares’ price and alter-
native investment opportunities, as well as costs induced by different barriers to 
the exchange. This means, that after the initial distribution of property rights is 
made (privatization transaction is closed) the key condition for the success of 
privatization is reduction of informative costs, simplifying procedures and re-
moving barriers to the exchange. Property rights are determined by the scope of 
actions owner can undertake when exercising them, and the value of property 
rights changes depending on what owner can do with his property. Benefits of 
private property are higher when the set of choices how to use that property is 
wider. Private property can give positive results only in the environment that 
doesn’t limit possibilities to exercise property rights; environment that promote 
freedom and protection of contract.
27 
 
3. Privatization – return to Smith's ideas 
 
The emergence of crucial institutions that form the framework of economic sys-
tem and determine rules of economic game is not only and exclusively under the 
influence of economic factors. History and culture, tradition, sociological and 
psychological patterns, as well as geographic factors, significantly influence 
evolution of economic institutions. The importance of these non-economic fac-
tors is recognized by Adam Smith, who didn’t studied and discussed them sepa-
rately from economic theory. At the time of late feudalism, institutions of capi-
talism emerged evolutionary, spontaneously, as an organic process.  
Representatives of neo-classical economics consider that emergence of 
economic system and its institutions are exclusively determined by economic 
factors. But, new institutional economics and new political economy are bring-
ing back Smith’s ideas to economic theory and recognize the importance of non-
economic factors in emergence of economic institutions. According to the new 
theoretical approaches economic phenomena and emergence of economic insti-
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tutions can not be explained exclusively by economic factors. North
28 was 
among the first who outlined multidisciplinary evolutionary theory of economic 
institution of capitalism. Explanation of economic phenomena by both economic 
and non-economic factors characterizes new political economy, more precisely 
public choice theory
29, theory of economic constitution
30 and theory of collective 
action
31. Evolutionary theories of capitalism have shown why private companies 
and private property are featured with more productive allocation of resources 
and higher level of economic efficiency on the firm level, as well as on an econ-
omy level in comparison with an economic system where collective property 
prevails and central planning is coordinative mechanism. These theories also 
explain why individual and social transaction costs are lower in the system with 
prevailing private property then in a system with prevailing state property. Bu-
chanan, Brennan i Olson go further in their theories and discuss the way how 
economy can be transferred from the system with prevailing collective property 
and central planning to the system with dominant private property and markets.  
These theories have proved that transition from one economic system 
into another, as for example transition from socialistic and collectivistic system 
to capitalistic free market economy with dominant private property, can not be 
achieved only through changes of economic institutions, no matter how deep and 
comprehensive that change is. New institutions will function if the foundations 
of the economic constitutions of the country are changed. That’s why privatiza-
tion is not just a simple transfer of ownership and control over resources. It is 
not simple transfer of managing function from the hands of state to the hands of 
private owners, but is a lever of the comprehensive process of redefining eco-
nomic constitution of the country. If the privatization is not followed with com-
prehensive and deep change of economic constitution of a country, it can not 
reach set goals, because privatized companies will not be able to operate in old 
and unchanged environment. Unchanged system means that the rules of eco-
nomic game are not compatible with private property, and private companies 
will not be able to do business in such an environment. This incompatibleness 
between economic constitution of the country and new institutions resulted in 
modest results of privatization in terms of economic restructuring and efficiency 
of privatized companies in beginning phase of transition.  
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These theories of privatization don’t deal with the issues of efficiency of 
different privatization methods and models. They describe the way how the rules 
of the economic game, i.e. economic institutions and relations between them can 
be changed in a consistent manner. The basic foundations of these rules are 
given below. 
  It is the obligation and privilege of the Government and Parliament, 
i.e. the state to create legal framework of the transition, which 
strictly defines what cannot be done after the transfer of state prop-
erty into the hands of private owner.  
  As a rule, state administration, should not act as a seller or buyer on 
privatization market, because government agencies and other gov-
ernment bodies are driven by different incentive structures then 
other economic agents, whose interests and benefits can be defined 
in economic terms.  
As the state and local governments are legal owners of non-private prop-
erty, these institutions can and should delegate its authority to private agents and 
managers of state enterprises to conclude individual transactions of privatization. 
Thus, the state restrain from interfering economic transactions with non-
economic interests. Managers of state companies will use information asymme-
tries for their own benefits, but the same information asymmetry will be present 
even if government agencies administer each single privatization transaction. 
The reason for this is that state would only get information provided by compa-
nies’ managers, who, in such case, won’t have incentives to strive for successful 
privatization. It can be concluded that the state will be better off in case when 
delegates its authority to conclude individual privatization transactions to eco-
nomic agents. Even though privatization transactions are unique and specific the 
only way to put the privatization under the control of economic rationality is to 
delegate transfer of ownership rights from state to economic agents. However, 
this will be the truth only in case of clear, transparent, predictable and competi-
tive rules and procedures of delegating ownership rights.  
Decision makers must learn that private property won’t be efficient if 
they don’t protect freedom of contract, reduce the tax and regulatory burden to a 
minimum, pursue a policy of monetary freedom, and open your borders to 
goods, services and investors. If do so, then they “will unleash the entrepreneu-
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Privatization process in transition economies is the basis for economic reforms 
in other areas. Different countries have used different methods and techniques in 
privatization. Privatization is aimed to increase efficiency of privatized compa-
nies, and depending on other goals, different methods of privatization were used 
in practice. Successes of used methods vary from country to country. Many em-
pirical studies tried to isolate the factors that influence success of certain meth-
ods. But the same techniques gave completely different results: in some coun-
tries the results were excellent; in other the results were poor. Private property 
by itself can not result in increased efficiency of privatized companies in inap-
propriate economic environment. Privatized companies can not operate in an 
environment featured with non-existing protection of property rights and con-
tracts, with weak judiciary system; in an environment with no freedom of con-
tracting, high taxes and complicated procedures to enter and exit business. 
These empirical results speak partially in favor of theories of organic 
evolution of property right, but clearly confirm public choice theory, theory of 
economic constitution, and theory of collective action. These theories and au-
thors argues that transfer from one economic system into another, such as transi-
tion from collectivistic, socialistic system into capitalism and market economy, 
with prevailing private property can not be achieved through isolated change of 
individual economic institutions, no matter how deep that change would be.  
New institutions will be feasible only in case of comprehensive change 
of economic constitution of a country. Thus, privatization is not just a simple 
transfer of property rights from hands of state into hands of private owners, but 
one of the levers of the comprehensive process aimed to change basic founda-
tions of economic system. If the privatization is not followed by comprehensive 
change of economic system, i.e. economic constitution, it can not give adequate 
results, because privatized companies can not function in unchanged system. 
Unchanged system means that the rules of economic game are incompatible with 
private property and privatized companies will not be able to do business in such 
environment. This incompatibleness and discrepancy is the source of modest 
results privatization has given with regard to economic restructuring, improve-
ments of productivity and rise of efficiency of privatized companies in first 
phases of transition. 
The development of new private sector and rise of number of new pri-
vate enterprises entering the business is considered to be the consequence of pri-
vatization in initial transition phases. However, transition countries' experiences 
has shown that, no matter which method dominated in privatization process, rise 
of new private sector significantly contributes to the success of privatization. 
Protection of property rights, freedom of contracting, low taxes, simple 
procedures to start and go out of business and efficient judiciary system are the 
most important elements of economic environment favorable for rise of new en-Privatization in Economic Theory 
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terprises. These same features are of vital importance for successful privatization 
of state owned enterprises. It can be concluded that the chances for successful 
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Privatizacija u ekonomskoj teoriji 
 
Rezime:  Nijedna transakcija privatizacije državne imovine se u praksi nije realizovala 
shodno teorijskim pravilima po kojima se odvijaju obične tržišne transakcije. Čak se ni 
transakcije privatizacije državne imovine u razvijenim tržišnim ekonomijama ne mogu 
objasniti Walrasovim, Arrowovim ili Leontijevljevim modelima ekvilibrijuma, niti mode-
lima ekvilibrijuma teorije igara. U svim ovim teorijskim modelima transakcije razmene 
odvijaju se u tržišnim uslovima i uz dominaciju privatnih svojinskih prava. Ali, uprkos 
tome transakscije privatizacije preduzeća u razvijenim zapadnoevropskim privredama se 
razlikuju od klasičnih preuzimanja kompanija, u kojima jedan privatni vlasnik kupuje kon-
trolni paket od drugog, takođe privatnog vlasnika. Razlog je to što država kao vlasnik pro-
dajom svog vlasništva želi da ostvari i ne-ekonomske ciljeve. Transakcije privatizacije u 
tranzicionim zemljama se u još manjoj meri mogu objašnjavati klasičnim mikroekonom-
skim modelima, jer se privatizacija obavljala uglavnom masovno i u uslovima kad insti-
tucije tržišta i privatne svojine nijesu postojale. U radu se analizira fenomen privatizacije sa 
stanovišta različitih ekonomskih teorija i zaključuje da empirijski rezultati idu u prilog 
tvrdnji teorije javnog izbora – „public choice“-a (Buchanan, 1978), teorije „economic con-
stitution“ - ekonomskog poretka (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985), (Buchanan and Tullock, 
1989), a još više teorije „kolektivne akcije“ (Olson, 1982). Ove ekonomske teorije tvrde da 
prelaz iz jednog ekonomskog sistema u drugi, kakav je npr. prelaz iz kolektivističkog, soci-
jalističkog sistema u kapitalizam, odnosno tržišnu ekonomiju sa dominantnom privatnom 
svojinom ne može da se postigne kroz izolovanu promenu pojedinih ekonomskih insti-
tucija, ma kako duboka i temeljna bila ta promena. Drugim riječima privatizacija ne može 
dati adekvatne rezultate ukoliko nije praćena sveobuhvatnom promenom ekonomskog sis-
tema, jer privatizovane kompanije neće moći da funkcionišu u nepromenjenom sistemu. 
 
Ključne reči: Privatna svojinska prava, Privatizacija, Transakcije, Institucije, Tranzicija  
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